Abstract. In [6], Pouget et al. have conjectured the existence of so-called multiheaded worms and found a couple of them on attack traces collected on a single honeypot. These worms take advantage of several distinct attack techniques to propagate but they use only one of them against a given target. From a victim's viewpoint, they are therefore indistinguishable from the other classical worms that always propagate using the same attack vector or same sequence of attack vectors. This paper aims at confirming the existence of these worms by studying a very large dataset. The validation process led to three important contributions. First, we establish the existence and assess the importance of three distinct classes of attacks seen in the wild. Second, we propose a new method to correlate attack traces time series and apply it to search for multi-headed worms. Third, we offer and discuss results of the analysis of 15 months of data gathered over 28 different platforms located all over the world.
Introduction
The concept of worm, as a programming paradigm, has been introduced more than 25 years ago [8] and has been used to propagate malicious code on a large scale as early as September 1988 with the first ADM worm targeting the DNS infrastructure [3] and with the so called Morris worm, also known as the Internet worm, hitting the Internet in November 1988 [9, 2] . However, one had to wait more than ten years to see worms routinely used by hackers and various techniques used to speed up their propagation on the Internet [10] . We refer the interested reader to the taxonomy of worms published in [12] . The authors provide several examples of worms, classifying them according to various viewpoints, namely worm target discovery and selection strategies, worm carrier mechanisms, worm activation, possible payloads, and plausible attackers who would employ a worm. As indicated in [12] , worm authors are not so much interested anymore in gaining faith for having created the fastest worm or the worm having compromised the largest amount of machines. Instead, worm spreading is now seen as a preliminary phase to conduct other fraudulent activities to gain money using various techniques (spam relays, extortion with DDoS threats, pay-per-click fraud, etc.). Therefore, worms are now designed to make their propagations as stealthy as possible.
Multi-headed worms, identified by Pouget et al. in [6] , belong to a new class of worms designed with stealthiness in mind. These sophisticated programs can break into target machines using several different techniques. This, by itself, is not new. The Morris worm [9] , in 1988, already had this feature. It was propagating using attacks against three different services: rshd, fingerd and sendmail. The Morris worm, after having selected a target, was trying all three attacks, one after another, interrupting the process only in the case of a successful intrusion. Several other worms have, since then, used the same strategy. They all are fairly easy to identify thanks to the known sets (or sequences) of attacks they try against their targets. Multi-headed worms, as defined in [6] , use a very different strategy: they probe each target with only one of the attacks they are capable of. This strategy decreases their chance of success but increases their stealthiness. Indeed, there will be no trace left anywhere highlighting the fact that a new worm has been created combining attacks X, Y and Z as they will never be tried together by a given attacker against a given attackee.
In [6] , the authors had used traces left on a simple low interaction honeypot to highlight the existence of a couple of such multi-headed worms propagating in the Internet. At that time, only one of them, Nachia, had been acknowledged by intrusion detection and antivirus vendors. This seminal work had been carried out on a single platform and, therefore, was not able to assess the seriousness of the threats posed by this new class of worms.
In this paper, we carry out a systematic identification of multi-headed worms in attack traces collected thanks to 28 distinct low interaction honeypot platforms, located in 15 different countries, over a 15 month period. In order to perform this experiment, we had to design a different method than the one originally proposed in [6] because of algorithmic complexity issues. The application of this validation process led to three important contributions: i) we establish the existence and assess the importance of three distinct classes of attacks seen in the wild; ii) we offer a new generic method to correlate attack traces time series that could be applied to other kinds of datasets; iii) we offer and discuss results of the analysis of 15 months of data gathered over 28 different platforms located all over the world.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the state of the art and describes the two main reasons why the solution provided in [6] does not scale. Section 3 presents the three distinct steps of the new method we propose: (i) Identification and selection of attack classes (ii) Identification of correlated platforms (iii) Root causes identification. Section 4 provides a summarized description and discussion of the most interesting results obtained. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Problem Statement
In this section, we describe the original solution provided in [6] for the identification of multi-headed worms and explain the two main reasons why this solution does not scale. For the sake of completeness, we first start by briefly describing the data collection environment considered in that work as well as some definitions of terms used throughout this paper.
The Leurré.com Environment
The Leurré.com environment is a distributed setup of low interaction honeypots. As of now, there are approximately 50 different partners that host a so-called platform. All platforms are configured exactly the same way. Each platform emulates, thanks to
